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by R o g e r  J. S o u t h a l l
A num ber o f recent studies have focussed on the consequences o f econo­
mic dependence on external m arkets and foreign capital for G old Coast poli­
tical life.1 It is the purpose o f  the present paper to  further this analysis by 
exploring the relationship between fluctuations in the world cocoa price and 
G old Coast ‘cocoa pro test'. In particular, it will be argued that the heavy 
dependence o f  the local econom y on an inherently unstable world cocoa price 
was directly responsible for polaiising relations between expatriate cocoa- 
buying firms and African producers during the period 1S90-193S; th a t there 
was a  direct link between the form ation o f  oligopolistic European buying 
combines and the developm ent o f  increasingly vigorous producer p ro test 
m ovem ents and th a t the climax o f the process o f  polarisation, the cocoa 
hold-up o f  1937/38, underm ined the political structure o f colonialism.
I The creation o f  dependence
The initial developm ent o f the cocoa industry  in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries by m igrant farm ers has been analysed in such detail 
by Polly Hill that there is no need for it to  detain  us here.2 Suffice it to  say 
th a t in its earliest days the expansion o f cocoa growing was undertaken by 
Akwapim , Shai and K robo m igrants who were responsive to widening com ­
mercial opportunities provided by an expanding world cocoa m arket, aided 
and abetted by the resident Akyem chiefs in  the Eastern Province who were 
ready to  sell them  vacant stool lands for cash. As the m igration progressed 
eastw ard from the m igrants’ hom e areas land shortage in the oldest regions 
became acute and farm ers who wished to  m ake further investm ent in cocoa 
farm s were forced further afield. Thus the m igration entered a new phase 
w ith the ‘lorry age’ afte r 1918 when obstacles o f  distance could be more easily 
overcome, and m igrants bought land in far-flung areas, a ttracted  by the un­
exploited forests o f  the Central Province, the Volta D istrict and, to some ex­
tent, Ashanti. The enterprise o f  the m igrants was, however, soon comple­
m ented by that o f  indigenous producers, especially in Ashanti, where the 
role o f  m igrant farm ers in cocoa growing (as opposed to  the role o f  m igrant 
labourers from  the N o rthern  Territories and French W est Africa) was m ini­
m al.
So enthusiastically did farm ers embrace the new crop that by 1910 cocoa— 
which had not been effectively introduced until 1879 — had become the 
colony’s m ost valuable p roduct. By 1911 the G old C oast had attained the
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position o f the world’s forem ost cocoa-producing country  and, in the years 
that followed, production continued to expand so that in the peiiod 1915-34 
cocoa accounted for over three-quarters o f  the colony’s export earnings, and  
only declined in iclative im portance in the late 1930s owing to  a fall in the 
average world price o f  cocoa and a rise in the world pries o f  gold (the colony’s 
second m ajor export). The m ajor effect o f farm ers’ enterprise (taken along 
with the activities o f expatriate firms which exported gold, diam onds, m an­
ganese and timber, etc.) was thus to  transform  the econom y into one whose 
principal characteristic was ‘openness’ to  world m arket forces — in o ther 
words, that integration took place through the exchange o f a limited set of 
raw materials for the m anufactuied consum er goods o f overseas countries. 
There were no domestic industries o f any im portance which were oriented to  
the satisfaction of the colony’s material needs except through the mecha­
nisms o f international trade. The well-being o f  the econom y was therefore de­
fined in term s o f the m axim isation o f the colony’s trade with the rest o f  the 
world. ‘This Colony, as an  exporter, begins and ends as a producer o f  certain 
raw m aterials, notably o f cocoa o f  which she normally furnishes more than  
one-third o f  the world’s supply,’ explained the G overnor in  19I7.3 It follow­
ed that the G old C oast was overwhelmingly dependent on  the world price 
o f  cocoa. Howevei, the price o f  the ccm m odity was subject to  extreme 
fluctuations in response to  changes, bo th  short and long-term  in world 
supply and demand. It is the effect o f  these price changes on the partici­
pants in the Gold C oast cocoa trade, and notably its political consequences, 
which constitu tes the principal interest o f this paper.
II The consolidation o f  expatriate capital
The large am ounts o f  capital needed to  finance the purchase, shipping 
and overseas sale o f the cocoa crop m eant that African participation in the 
export sector was always limited. For the entire period 1890-33, therefore, 
the export structure was dom inated by expatriate firms which had access to  
sufficient capital to undertake the entire m arketing venture, from  local pu t- 
chase to  overseas sale. However, the nature o f  expatriate dom ination varied 
considerably: at times it was more oppressive towards African farmers th an  
a t others, depending on the cocoa price and the level o f com petition between 
purchasers. Increasingly, how'cvcr, the m ajor factor which determined the 
exploitative impact on producers was the tendency for the diverse units o f  ex­
patriate  capital to merge into larger combinations.
The process o f capital consolidation was uneven, related as it was to  the 
fluctuating nature o f the world cocoa trade, However, three broad periods 
can be distinguished: first, from 1890 to  1920/21, which was a period o f  ini­
tial expansion in the cocoa trade when marketing conditions were relatively 
open, though latterly d istorted by the effects o f  the First W orld W ar and the 
consequent boom ; second, from 1921 to  1931, when uncertain trading con­
ditions encouraged ran k  speculation, which in  tu rn  caused a  num ber o f firms
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sustaining heavy losses to be absorbed by or to  seek unison (either in the form 
o f  mergers o r buying agreements) w ith others more strongly placed financial­
ly th an  themselves; and finally, 1932 to 1938, the post-D epression and reco­
very years, during which time the m ajor characteristic o f  the Gold Coast 
trade was its overwhelming dom ination by a  relatively small and close-knit 
group o f  purchasing firms, which ultim ately merged their interest in an in­
dustry-wide buying agreem ent in  1937.
1890-1920/21 The period o f  initial capital expansion
The first commercial shipm ent o f  cocoa from the G old Coast was made 
in  1891 by the Basel M ission Trading C om pany.4 The cocoa was sent to  
H am burg, where the m arket response m ust have been favourable, for within 
a  few years the G erm an West Africa T rading C om pany was controlling 
nearly 40 per cent o f Gold Coast ex ports .5 The rem ainder o f the trade was 
initially distributed amongst three British trading firms -  Alexander Miller 
Brothers, F . & A. Swanzy, and the African Association — which in the 1890s 
were still primarily interested in rubber and  palm  oil.
F rom  the earliest days the expatriate firms sought to  depiess the price 
o f  cocoa by form ing agreements am ong themselves. D uring  the 1890s these 
agreem ents (or ‘pools’) were informal an d  localised, but in 1903, Swanzy, 
M illers, the African Association and the Basel M ission Trading Com pany 
entered a  form al agreem ent lim iting com petition am ongst themselves in the 
purchase o f cocoa, rubber and palm  o il.6 The agreem ent was renewed 
annually in 1904 and 1905, and was extended for a period o f  five years from 
1906, a t which tim e the opportunity  was taken to  draw  the G erm an West 
Africa T rading Com pany into the po o l.7 As a result, when new com petitors 
entered the tracje (notably Cadbury in  1907), they were confronted with a 
hostile com bination o f  established firms which had been exploiting their 
favourable situation  to  pay producers ra ther less than  a free m arket price. 
However, by 1909/10, the pressures o f open com petition had reasserted 
themselves, and the G erm an West Africa T rading C om pany and the Basel 
M ission hud broken away from Millers, Sw 'anzyand the African A ssociation.8 
The la tter three firms m aintained their relations and, indeed, were associated 
so closely together that they became know n in the trade as ‘the com bine’.
F rom  1910 onwards, an  increasing num ber o f expatriate  firms entered 
the G old Coast cocoa m arket, so that, by the middle o f the F irst W orld W ar, 
the overall dom ination by the handful o f  earliest firms had  been replaced by a  
considerably more competitive situation although, a t the outbreak  o f hosti­
lities, G erm an firms were removed from  the trade completely. Some indica­
tion o f  the relatively open nature of the trade is given by an  exam ination o f  
statistics relating to the export o f  cocoa to  the  United K ingdom  in the period 
1915-17.
T he im pact o f  the F irst W orld W ar upon the export structure was 
twofold. F irst, restrictions on  the im port o f  cocoa into the United Kingdom
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Distribution o f  Trad2 Amongst Cocoa Shippers to the U.K., 1915-17
1915/16 1916/17 (10 months)
Number o f Percentage Number o f Percentage
Exporters o f  Exports Exporters o f  E xports
Large European
Firm s (Over 1000
tons) ................. 12 75.94 14 75.20
Small European
Firm s (U nder 1000
tons) ................. 23 13.53 26 10.58
A frican Exporters 23 8.60 29 10.56
Exporters o f  Indeter­
m inate O rig in ... 3 1.86 7 3.66
T otal Export to U .K . 44425 tons 44536 tons
Calculated fro m : National Archives o f  Ghana, Accra (Henceforth cited as 
N A G ) A D M  12'3 27, M emorandum on the Gold Coast Trade Prospects fo r
1917i 18, by A .R . Slater, 20 August 1917.
: nriccs to levels so far in advance o f those currently prevailing in W est 
ca that cocoa a ttracted  the a tten tion  o f large num bers o f  speculators 
who were soon to participate in the trade. As it was, the restrictions, which 
were introduced because o f a shortage o f shipping space, limited firms to 
exporting only 50 per cent o f the am ount o f  cocoa that they had sent to  the 
U nited  Kingdom  the  previous y e a r.9 Given the distribution  o f trade pre­
vailing in 1916/17 (iee Table abcve), the inflated profits available in England 
m ainly benefited the expatriate firms. Second, the need for industrial recon­
struction  encouraged European cap ital to  form m ore powerful com binations 
to  meet the challenge o f  the post-w ar settlement.
The African A ssociation, Swanzy and Millers had associated together 
on  the G old C oast since the tu rn  o f  the century. Their bonds had been 
strengthened a t the beginning o f  the war by a series o f trade agreem ents, 
b u t the three firms had retained their m anagerial autonom y. However, 
news th at the soap m agnate, Lord Leverhuime (who had recently entered 
the  West A frican sphere) was contem plating m aking a bid for the African 
Association, persuaded the various firms to merge their interests together 
in the African and  E astern  T rade C orporation  (A & ETC) in 1919. The 
am algam ation  was accom panied by the wholesale absorp tion  o f  three 
sm aller firms concerned w ith the  export of cocoa from  the G old C oast, 
namely Crom bie S teedm an & C o., the Gold C oast M achinery & T rading 
C o . L td., and the T arq u ah  T rad ing  Co. L td .10 The result was th a t the
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A & ETC and its subsidiaries were able to  export som ething like a quarter 
o f  the cocoa crop from  the G old C oast in 1919/20.
The second merger o f  im portance to the cocoa export trade was that 
between Cadbury Brothers L td . and J. S. Fry & Sons L td. to form the British 
C ocoa & Chocolate C om pany in M ay 1919, which occurred in order to 
m eet the expected post-w ar com petition from Am erican, Swiss and Dutch 
m anufacturers.11 On the G old  C oast, the merger took the form o f a com­
bination  o f  buying interests. T ogether the two firms had launched a buying 
agency, the Coomassie C ocoa C om pany, in A shanti, in 1917 and , in 1918, 
this was complemented when F ry  —  newcomers to W est Africa — injected 
fresh capital into C adbury’s existing buying agency.12
T he post-war situation  in w h'ch these new expatriate  com binations 
se t to  work was favourable. Ever since the war had ended shipping restric­
tions had remained in force, and  preference had been given to  the export o f 
palm  kernels and oil. Prices fo r cocoa rem ained low, so that exporters took 
the opportunity  to buy stocks to  the limit o f  their storage capacity in expec­
tation  o f violent changes in the m arket situation  as soon as restrictions 
were lifted. Their expectations were fully justified, for once the restrictions 
were laid aside the cocoa trade  went wild. F rom  an  average Accra price of 
2 7 /-per cwt in 1918, prices soared to  47/- in 1919 and 80/6d in 1920.13 
T he trade  suddenly experienced a vast influx o f new buyers and shippers. 
African buying firms, previously concentrating  mainly on the collection o f 
cocoa in the interior, sought to  cut ou t the E uropean m erchants and  ship 
directly to the overseas m arket. Sim ilarly, new ‘m ushroom ’ companies 
established by European speculators, such as T in  Areas o f  N igeria and Vas- 
m arnei Cocoa Com pany, jo stled  the ranks o f  the o lder buying firms. For 
a time, prospects were buoyed up by a  voracious dem and from the Am erican 
and continental m arkets. Few firms were w-ary enough to  look ahead, and 
a lm ost all bought continuously th roughou t 1919/20 on  the supposition th a t 
prices would continue to  soar, and th at they would be able to  offload pu r­
chases at a profit. However, the boom  o f 1919/20 was followed by a massive 
slum p the following season. 1920 saw the  highest and lowest prices ever 
recorded on the world cocoa m arket, and a M arch price a t Liverpool for 
Accra cocoa o f 127/- was followed by a Decem ber price o f  4 4 /- .14 It all 
happened so swiftly th a t alm ost every buyer was caught ou t, and the m ajority 
o f  firms were left with heavy stocks th a t they were unable to  un load on to 
a saturated  world m arket. T he vast m ajority  o f  A frican shippers were taken 
unaw ares and ended as perm anent casualties. Similarly, a large num ber o f 
speculative European buyers were forced off the m arket as uncerem oniously 
as they had jo ined it. T in Areas o f  Nigeria, fo r instance, who were so suc­
cessful in 1919 that they floated themselves as a reorganised venture the 
following year to the tune  o f  £300,000 in debentures, crashed heavily, and  
by 1921 had gone into liq u id a tio n .*5 But the m ushroom  com panies were 
not the only ones to  suffer, fo r the  m ajority  o f  established firms were also 
subject to  heavy financial loss. T he m ost fam ous exam ple was the A  & ETC
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which, a fte r netting a profit o f  nearly £250,000 in 1919/20, m ade a massive 
loss o f  £1,794,796 in 1920/21.16
W ithin  the space o f three years the  cocoa m arket had  seen bo th  trium ph 
and despair. It was a  violent fluctuation  which blessed a fo rtunate  minority 
and dam ned  the m ajority o f those who were buying cocoa on  the Gold 
C oast. A lthough some foresaw the  collapse in prices few were able to  avoid 
the consequences, and the m ajor difference between those who lived on 
and those who disappeared was no t in m arket skill but in the possession o f 
capital. T hus the large expatriate buyers who could call on  large financial 
reserves m ostly survived; but those who had little capital and w'ho could not 
w ithstand heavy loss —  E uropean and African alike —  were irrevocably 
swallowed up.
1921-1931. The era o f  speculation
T he decade separating the collapse o f the post-w ar boom  and  the onset 
o f the world depression was one in which instability in the cocoa trade en­
couraged a high level of speculation. In the first place, although in the inter­
war period the world supply o f  cocoa usually exceeded consum ption, there 
were brief, b u t highly significant periods when dem and ou tran  supply and 
prices were forced sharply upw ards. Second, the post-w ar years saw increas­
ing use o f  ‘fu tures’ o r advance contracts. Before the war H am burg had 
been the centre o f the world cocoa trade, but the subsequent increase in 
A m erican consum ption made New Y ork the fulcrum  o f  the post-w ar market. 
7 he New Y ork Cocoa Exchange was established in 1925 as a facility whereby 
A m erican m anufacturers —  who purchased their cocoa through (mainly 
British) interm ediaries — could guarantee  their fu ture supplies. British 
com m ercial interests, who wished to  recapture trade lost to  the American 
m arket, followed suit in 1928 with the opening o f  sim ilar exchanges in 
L ondon  and Liverpool. As a result speculation in the trade increased 
considerably, for the major business done on the exchanges revolved around 
purely paper transactions: the sale o f  futures contracts with no exchange of 
real cocoa being involved. M anufacturers would hedge their buying position 
by the possession o f  futures, and  would sell or purchase according to move­
m ents in world cocoa prices, but they were emulated by those w ith no real 
interest in the crop, with the result that the cocoa trade engaged the attentions 
o f  gam blers and speculators.
T his instability  was the underlying cause o f a fu rther consolidation of 
expatriate  capital by the end o f  the decade. The first com bination o f note 
was the cocoa pool which linked A &ETC, the Niger Com pany, the Anglo- 
G uinea C o rpora tion , and  Fram es Agency between 1925 and 1928.17 The 
agreem ent, whereby the participan ts agreed to  lim it price com petition 
between themselves and to share their total purchases in  agreed proportions, 
was operative from  O ctober 1925 and  in 1926 its scope was extended by the 
acquisition  o f  Pickering & B erthoud, another long established buying com­
pany, by a  subsidiary o f  the N iger C o m p a n y .  18
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There can be little d oub t that the participant firms found the agreement 
to  be profitable — at least initially — for it coincided with a period o f rising 
prices on  the world m arket. Indeed, so favourable were cocoa trends that 
the pool —  which controlled nearly ha lf the cocoa from the Gold Coast 
and  a  quarte r o f the cocoa in the world —  attem pted to reap speculative 
profits by m anipulating the world m arket. In 1926/27 the pool kept their 
stocks off the m arket at a  tim e when dem and for cocoa by American manu­
facturers was rising sharply, with the result that world prices increased 
ra p id ly .10 T he same tactics were repeated in 1927/28, and  determined 
efforts were m ade to  purchase an  increased proportion o f  the G old Coast 
c ro p .20 C om petition between buyers was fiercer than  a t any time since the 
boom , an d  conflict between m erchant and  m anufacturing elements o f expa­
tria te  capital was brought ou t into the open. C adbury & Fry, manufacturers 
who were usually reliant upon  the U .K . m arket for a t least one-third o f 
their cocoa, were so concerned at the rise in price that they ran down their 
stocks, and  relied entirely upon their buying agencies to pull them through 
the  crisis; and  ju st when their reserves w'ere nearly exhausted, Cadbury 
received vital supplies from  their agencies which kept them  off the home 
m arket a t a' critical m om ent. A t the same tim e American m anufacturers 
restricted  their consum ption so that world prices tumbled, leaving the pool 
with no op tion  but to unload their heavy stocks as quickly as possible at 
uneconom ic prices before world prices fell even fu rther.21
As a result o f heavy losses on cocoa, the pool was dissolved in August 
1928.22 All the participants had suffered financially, but the worst hit was 
the A & ETC, which incurred a  loss o f  £96,953. A lthough this loss followed 
six years o f  generous profits am ounting in to tal to  over £2 million, it was 
enough to  prostra te  the C orporation , which had extiemely limited reserves 
(having distributed the profits o f  previous years to  its shaieholdeis). Like 
m ost trad ing  organisations, the A & ETC was dependent for short-term  liqui­
dity on  the banks; now these creditors insisted that they install their own 
representatives as com pany chairman. The new incumbent, Sir Robert Waley 
Cohen, a t once concluded that the operations of the A & ETC and the Niger 
C om pany were unduly duplicative, and engaged in negotiation with Lever 
Brothers (who had taken the Niger C om pany over in 1920) to bring about, 
perm anent reconciliation o f  interest. On 3 M arch 1929, the A & ETC and the 
N iger C om pany were m erged as equal holding com panies in the U nited 
Africa C om pany (U .A .C .).23
T he speculative losses incurred by the pool inspired in the managem ent o f 
the U .A  C. such a revulsion against instability that they now’ envisioned the 
creation  o f  a monopoly buying organisation  for West A frican produce 
which w ould combine the interests o f  m anufacturing capital with those of 
com m ercial buyers. Thus, in  early 1929, U .A .C . put forw ard proposals 
whereby C adbury  & Fry  would merge their buying organisations w ith the 
m erchant com pany in to  a  Com bined Buying Scheme for a period o f ten years, 
during which time sales o f  cocoa would be m ade direct to cocoa m anufao
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turers in Britain, America and on the European continen t.24 However, C ad­
bury & F ry  opted to retain their independence, although they did agree to 
co-operate with U .A .C. in lim iting price levels o n  the G old C oast in the early 
part of the following cocoa season (1928/29).25
Having been rebufTcd by the m anufacturers, U .A .C . tu rned  to  streng­
thening their ties w ith commercial interests, and in season 1929/30 form ed a 
new cocoa pool w ith (after Cadbury & Fry) the next seven largest shippeis 
o f cocoa from  the Gold C oast.2$ But the pool was not successful,22 a factor 
which convinced U.A.C. that unless they could draw  Cadbury & Fry into 
m utual co-operation, the advantages o f  an  effective buying m onopoly could 
never be attained. Consequently, U .A .C . once m ore approached C adbury 
with an eye to  a  reconciliation o f differences.
On this occasion, Cadbury & Fry w'ere prepared  to  be m ore co-operative. 
Over the preceding seasons, the m anufacturers had become increasingly con­
cerned a t the growing cost o f employing African cocoa brokers. Thus, in re­
turn  for assurances concerning the lim ita tion  o f  cash advances and com m is­
sion paym ents to  brokers the following season, C adbury —. while rejecting 
formal m em bership o f the pool —  agreed to  go along w ith it in restricting 
price, with the provision that they retained their freedom  to act indcpen Jcntly 
if  they so w ished.2 8 As a result o f this, a pool consisting o f  the leading com ­
mercial buyers, who together had a buying capacity o f 70 per cent o f the 
cocoa crop, was in effective alliance w ith the largest m anufacturing buyer on 
the G old C oast, w hich accounted for ano ther ten per cent.
The form ation o f this latest com bination  coincided w ith a sharp d rop in 
rid dem and for cocoa. Prices on the G old  Coast came tum bling down from  
those o f  the previous year, and producers — with one voice —- denounced 
the pool as the cause o f  their distress; and in the wake o f their cry followed 
the most determ ined resistance to their dom ination  th at the expatriate firms 
had yet encountered. A ‘cocoa hold-up’ —• that is, the deliberate and organi­
sed refusal o f  farm ers to sell their p ioduce to  the buying firms —  ran  from  
August to  early January (although it was only effective in the Central and 
Eastern Provinces). However, the disturbances it caused were o f  more concern 
to  the colonial adm inistration which was anxious about its political impli­
cations) th an  to  the expatriate firms themselves, for they were ail the while 
able to purchase cocoa in A shanti; and  when the hold-up finally collapsed 
as a result o f  certain internal contradictions, cocoa flooded on  to  the m ar­
ket and firms were able to buy a t unusually low prices.
1932-38. Consolidation and oligopoly.
The 1930-31 pool was dissolved before the opening o f  the following 
cocoa season because the m ajority o f the participants were distrustful o f the 
m anner in  which the U .A.C. was a ttem pting  to  extend its dom inance over 
the entire spectrum  o f  West African trad e ,2® and over the course o f  the next 
few years —  until 1937 —  there were no buying agreem ents sufficiently
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comprehensive to  elim inate entirely competitive influences from the trade. 
In  addition, a continuously low price o f cocoa encouraged the entry into the 
trade o f a num ber o f new buyers to  replace those who had fallen by the 
wayside.30
N onetheless, during the 1930s, the distinguishing characteristic o f the 
export structu re  o f  the G old C oast cocoa trade was the comprehen­
siveness o f the expatriate  oligopoly. In the first place, the m erchant firms had 
by this tim e extended their buying organisations along the expanded net­
work o f  railways and roads th at were built in the 1920s, one result o f which 
was th at they invaded territory  w hich had previously been the preserve of 
African buying firms.
Second, the trade fell more a n d  more under the influence o f  a few com­
panies. D uring  the First W orld W ar it would seem that about 75 per cent o f 
the crop was exported by about a dozen expatriate firms, the balance being 
exported by between fifty and sixty smaller shippers (See Table above). 
This relatively open structure was then  transform ed by the merger o f impor­
tan t expatriate  exporters in to  larger buying units at the end o f  the war and 
by the slum p o f  1920/21, which brought ru in  to  the m ajority  o f smaller 
buyers. As only the large o r the lucky survived, virtually the whole trade 
fell under the control o f  exporters w ith capital reserves o f considerable size 
and, by 1937/28, 95 pei cent o f  the crop was exported by only 14 firms. 
Thereafter, a lthough some firms left the trade and others entered, the struc­
ture rem ained basically the sam e, until the oft-quoted situation  in 1936/37 
was reached where only 13 firms exported  98 per cent o f  the c ro p .31
Third, w ithin this broad oligopolistic structure, there emerged an  elite 
core o f buyers who had a disproportionate influence over the m arket by 
reason o f  their large capital resources or by com bination o f  their interests. 
This elite was centred upon the U .A .C . (which extended its control when its 
parent com pany, Unilever, took over G.B. Ollivant in 1932) and Cadbury & 
Fry. In 1936/37, for instance, the form er com bination together exported 
47.92 per cent o f  the entire crop (U .A .C . 37.17 p e rce n t +  G.B. Ollivant 
10.75 per cent), whilst the latter exported  15.42 per cen t.32
The world price o f  cocoa, depressed in  the early 1930s, made a recovery 
tow ards the end  o f the decade, clim axing in 1936/37. Accra cocoa a t Liver­
pool, which had  finished the previous season at 24/6d, shot up to  a peak o f  
59/- in January. C om petition between buying firms on the G old  Coast was 
hectic, and  producers enjoyed the best prices since the late 1920s. However, 
tow ards the end  o f  the season, it becam e evident that the G old C oast crop 
was larger th an  expected and th at m anufacturers were overbought, with the 
result that, by August, prices dropped  back to  between 35/- and 40/- a cw t.33 
M any buying firms were caught unawares and experienced considerable 
losses. C hastened by this unexpected reverse, the firms looked around for 
a  rem edy fo r their various ills, whose cause they diagnosed as excessive 
rivalry between themselves. As a result, once more they sought to  restrict 
competitive buying.
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The moving spirit behind the new b id /o r  com bination was, as previously, 
the U .A.C. which had found its cocoa trading operations to be generally 
unprofitable.34 U .A .C .’s new objective was to  form a pool which would 
be fully comprehensive, an d  to  this end—’having secured the cooperation 
o f the o ther m erchants—they entered into negotiations with the m anufac­
turing buyers (C adbury & Fry, Lyons and the Cooperative W holesale 
Society). A t first, the m anufacturers were w ary; but after considerable 
discussion, Cadbury & Lyons resolved to  en te r the buying scheme, which 
came in to  operation on  1 O ctobei 1937, and  which united all the m ajor 
buying firms (except CW S), who together had  accounted for 94 per cent o f  
cocoa exports from the G old  C oast in  1936/37.
The objectives o f  the Buying Agreement were to  lim it participating 
firms to  the puichase o f an  agreed percentage o f the crop (agreed on the 
performances o f firms in seasons 1935/36 and  1936/37), and to  implement 
a  schedule o f  m arketing expenses which would limit the am ounts any firm 
could pay out in any buying activity (from  paym ent o f  brokers to  the actual 
price to  be paid for cocoa). The explicit rationale o f  the Agreement was to  
reduce the costs o f  purchasing cocoa incurred by the employm ent o f  cocoa 
brokers, which had been increasing steadily throughout the intcrw ar period. 
Formally, the price for cocoa paid  to producers was to  b'c the same as th at 
they would have received under conditions o f  free m arketing. However,
• he producers themselves disbelieved any such ju st intention, and when, in the 
,r!y weeks o f  the new cocoa season, prices dropped back (as a result o f  a 
educed dem and on the world m arket), they cam e to the immediate conclusion 
that the pool agreement was to  blame. Then, ju st as in 1930/31, they resorted 
to  the organised withholding o f  cocoa; bu t whereas on the earlier occasion 
the hold-up had failed th io u g h  lack o f  support, in 1937 the leaders were 
able to  mobilise a colony-wide resistance which w'as able to  freeze the m arket­
ing o f cocoa th roughout the season, until finally the political authorities 
intervened by appointing a  Com mission o f  Enquiry. It is to  the background 
o f this popular response to  expatriate  dom ination  that we shall now address 
ourselves.
I l l  The African response to expatriate domination
The history o f relations between expatriate  purchasers and African 
producers o f cocoa on  the G old  Coast is one that is punctuated by a  succes­
sion o f  econom ic disturbances which increasingly took on  a political aspect. 
The im m ediate cause o f  these disturbances is located in producers’ depen­
dence on the world cocoa price for their well-being, allied with their sense 
o f grievance a t expatriate  cocoa buying com binations which they held 
responsible for dow nw ard m ovem ents in  prices. Thus, as interconnections 
between the  various buying firms became m ore manifest and comprehensive, 
so did producers’ responses become m ore resolute, culm inating in the 
massively effective cocoa hold-up o f 1937/38.
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T he nature o f producer protest was intim ately linked to  the particular 
social form ations associated w ith the cocoa economy. As was indicated 
earlier, the developm ent o f  the cocoa industry was initially founded upon 
the  efforts o f  m igrant farm ers who purchased land in the Eastern Province. 
K en  Post has characterised this developm ent as involving a process of 
‘p e asan tisa tio n . . .  bound  up with a  sim ultaneous incorporation into the 
world capitalist system.’35 This view, o f course, conflicts markedly with 
the em phasis laid by Polly Hill on  the industry being the product o f ‘rural 
capitalism .’ W hat is argued here is th at, a lthough farmers acted capitalisti­
cally in H ill’s sense o f  prudential, long-term  investm ent,36 this is fully conso­
n a n t w ith Post’s process o f ‘peasantisation.’
Post takes the peasant condition to  be one o f exploitation by other classes 
which have their bases outside the rural areas and to be founded upen a 
specific mode o f production  which includes, am ong other social relationships, 
individual landow ncrship (though not excluding group use) a separation 
between the social division o f  labour and kinship, the operation o f the market 
principle, and a sepatation  between political hierarchy and  obligations and 
kinship. Post’s view therefore is inclusive o f H ill’s historic conception o f  
capitalism  as involving merely a  certain  type o f  econom ic behaviour (‘The 
operation  o f  the m arket principle’), and is specifically related, in the West 
A frican context, to  the exploitative processes operative under colonialism. 
However, if the exp lo ra tive  class was ultimately the imperial bourgeoisie 
(locally represented by the buying firms), ‘pcasantisation’ also involved 
a process o f rural differentiation, w ith conflicts between the various social 
groups within the peasantry being reflected in the nature o f  the rural ptotests.
The introduction  o f  freehold land ownership and the operation o f the 
m arket principle led to  the developm ent o f an  economically dom inant group 
o f  large, successful peasant, capitalistically-oriented farmers who often 
owned farm s in different parts o f  the country, and they were complemented 
by the form ation o f  a numerically larger mass o f  medium and small farmers 
m any o f whom became heavily indebted to  ru ral creditors o f  one sort o f 
ano ther. Alongside these producer groups there developed increasingly 
significant num oers o f non-producers who were associated with the indus- 
try-brokcrs, factors, and  clerks, the vast m ajority o f  whom were dependent 
for their livelihood on  em ploym ent opportunities provided directly o r 
indirectly (through the supply o f  m onetary advances to  purchase the crop) 
by  the expatriate fiims.
Superimposed upon this social structure were a variety o f factors which 
m ade it considerably m ore complex. In  the first place, whilst the farm ing 
com m unity rem ained heavily dependent upon family labour, the growth o f  
the industry—especially throughout A shanti—also entailed the widespread 
use o f  m igrant labour from  the north  and from French West Africa. Second, 
the interrelationship between brokerage and farm ing was probably closer 
th an  has usually been portrayed. The traditional presentation has usually 
depicted the roles o f  broker and farm er as distinct, w ith  the broker featuring
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as an ‘ou tsider’ to  the industry drawn in by the m oney-making opportunities 
offered by the m iddleman function. However, although ‘H ausas’, ‘Lagosians’ 
and ‘strangers’ were an  im portant elem ent, the indigenous p o p u lation  was 
probably equally significant in brokerage. Thus the indications a re  th a t— 
before they were sm ashed by the 1921 slump— there were num erous produce 
buying associations and firms which were run  by the farmers them selves. 
Similarly, it is clear that m any o f the more substantial farm ers acted  as 
brokers in their own right throughout the inter-w ar period37 and the creditor- 
deb tor relationship, which was integrally associated w ith the brokerage 
function, perm eated the en tire  com m unity, and  linked not only b roker to  
producer, but large farm er to  small.
Finally, the picture was made even m ore com plicated by the  role o f  the 
chiefs. Having initially sold land to  the m igrants, many o f  the  chiefs also 
became farm ers themselves; and having access to  ‘social cap ital’ provided 
by their position as traditional leaders, they often utilised their resources to  
become influential brokers. However, although they had interests in com m on 
w ith the rest o f the cocoa com m unity, the spread o f the capitalist, cash eco­
nom y w orked as a corrosive upon their political authority.
The early development o f  protest, 1890-1923
Records o f  farm ers’ reactions to  low prices and m erchant com binations 
portray  a sense o f  acute injustice and lesentm ent from the earliest years o f 
tire century. Basel M ission recoids show that the first pool agreem ent was 
resisted by the farm ers in 1903. Similarly, in 1904, ‘under the leadership o f 
their chiefs, they reacted against the lower world m arket prices w ith a  tem­
porary but complete em bargo o f  their produce.’33 a  few years later, in 1908, 
when prices slumped a fte r a boom  the year before, the O m anhene o f  New 
Juaben issued a prociam atior. forbidding growers in his division from  selling 
their cocoa. The resulting hold-up was sufficiently serious for the Accra 
Cham ber o f  Commerce to urge the G overnm ent to  explain to  farm ers that 
the m erchants could not affo-d to  pay higher prices.39
In  these early years protest was lim ited, in part because the pre-w ar 
period was one o f expansion and relative prosperity. Howevei the depressed 
conditions obtaining during the lattei part o f the w3r led to the developm ent 
o f a sense o f  grievance am ongst producers. An uneasy peace was m aintained 
if  only because the G overnor, Sir Hugh Clifford, was sufficiently sensitive 
to  the farm ers’ plight to  m ake strategic concessions to  them , as in 1917 when 
he reduced the export tax  on  cocoa. Even so, as the war con tinued , there 
were increasingly explicit indications that farm ers were considering resorting 
to  m ilitant protest. Chiefs in  the Eastern Province warned in  M arch  1918 
that they would soon have to  resort to  direct action  to  defend their people 
against ‘m anifest exploitation’40 and  early in  season 1919-20, chiefs in 
C entral Province issued orders to  the effect th a t farm ers should  n o t sell 
cocoa fo r less th an  £2 a  load .41 B ut the hold-up was short-lived, for the
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cocoa boom , when prices lurched upwards suddenly and hysterically, fol­
lowed alm ost immediately. While the boom lasted, growers responded with 
enthusiasm , but when the slump arrived in 1920, incom prehension and bewil­
derm ent were mixed w ith 3 suspicion that low prices for theii produce had 
been deliberately rigged by the merchants.
The first signs o f  active protest by producers appeared in the Akwapim 
district o f the Eastern Province in the last two m onths o f 1921, after prices 
had  fallen to  11/- per load o f  60 lb .42 The Akwapim  farm ers form ed an  
Association which forbade the sale o f cocoa under 15/- a lo ad ,43 and the 
Densu-Agya Planters A ssociation,44 which was based a t Asuboi, and chiefs 
and elders a t M angoase followed su it.45 W ithin a m atter o f  days, m erchants 
saw their supply o f cocoa dry  up, and the G overnm ent responded to  their 
distress by imm ediate and concerted efforts to  destroy a cam paign whoso 
effectiveness they believed to  be maintained by chiefly compulsion.
However, it swiftly became obvious that the prim e movers behind the 
cam paign were not the chiefs but certain large farm ers, notably one John 
Ayew o f M angoase, who in  December form ed a Farm ers’ Association a t 
Asuboi, a  m ovem ent which rapidly found support in  the neighbouring 
areas o f  Accra, Akwapim , Shai and Manya K robo .4® It was this Associa­
tion  which sent representatives to  meet w ith the G overnor at Nsawam  in 
January  1922, to  lay their com plaints against the firms; but Guggisberg was 
less interested in listening to  them  than in exhorting them  to m arket their 
cocoa, and in warning them  th at the adm inistration would no t toleiate 
their using coercion to  m aintain the hold-up.47
In 1921-22, the farm ers were not able to  sustain their resistance for long. 
W ith a loose organisational basis for the prom otion o f  solidarity, and a lack 
o f  financial reserves to  advance to  members with im m ediate needs, the hold­
up petered out in the th ird  week o f January. Im portantly , however, the 
hold-up was initially broken by the A & ETC, which tem porarily offered 
a price o f  17/6d to  coax a  supply o f cocoa on  to  the m arket4® and this then 
was followed by a  rise in he world price, which was reflected in a more 
satisfactory price level on the Gold Coast.
F anners could hardly be blamed for concluding th at the im provem ent 
in prices had been brought about by their own efforts. In  mid-1922, therefore, 
Ayew and his associates a ttem pted  to  organise a m ore am bitious scheme 
for the following season. Having formed a com m ittee and made arrange­
m ents to  rent storage sheds, Ayew called a mass m eeting o f  farmers a t 
Nsawam, where he laid before them a  set o f  byelaws for a G old C oast 
Farm ers’ Association (G C FA ). T he Association was accepted with great 
enthusiasm and sim ultaneously, w ith the current price o f cocoa a t 15/-, the 
farmers resolved to hold back their cocoa until they were offered 30/- a lo ad .49
The hold-up was effective in Eastern Province for about two m onths, 
being especially firm in the areas around Asuboi, M angoase, Adawso and  
Tinkong. As in 1921/22, coercive measures were exerted to m aintain the hold­
up, and farm ers found guilty o f  selling their crop were fined o r beaten.
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However, the movement never won the support o f  leading param ount 
chiefs, who were unwilling to  compromise their position vis-a-vis the govern­
ment, and who felt that their authority  was threatened by an  association led 
by an influential group o f nouveaux riches. W ithout the crucial backing o f 
these chiefs to  give it a wider legitimacy, the hold-up faltered in December.
A lthough the hold-ups'w cre largely unsuccessful in atta in ing  their imme­
diate objectives, they are significant in that they indicated a change in the 
social character o f a ttem pts to  resist expatriate  dom ination . In  the early 
1900s, such hold-ups as there weie had been led by the chiefs, whose authority  
then flowed more from popular than  governm ent support, but now that the 
structures o f  colonial rule were more firmly established, leading chiefs were 
visibly m ore subject to  the control o f  the adm inistration . Previously, too, 
activ ity by the larger farmers had been directed a t participating in the existing 
m arketing structures themselves, and Afiican firms had played a vital role in 
early years in supplying cocoa to the firms. However, with the spread o f com­
m unications and the consequent penetration o f  expattia te  firms in to  rural 
areas (by the opening o f  buying stations and the employment o f  brokers), this 
im portant g roup  felt increasingly alienated from  the European purchasers with 
whose activities theii interests had previously been so closely fused. Finally, 
their anger and frustration a t their increasing exclusion from  the marketing 
system found  its echo in the discontent am ongst smaller farm ers provoked 
by low price levels, after they had so recently experienced an apparently  mi­
raculous re tu rn  to good fortune during the boom .
The techniques o f the hold-up having failed, the G C F A  cast around for 
new m ethods for securing better returns to the grower. The solution they 
favoured was that o f  direct overseas shipm ent, whereby they would cut out 
dealing w ith the expatriate f rm s altogether. A num ber o f  projects were a t­
tem pted, but the one which made (he major im pact was the notorious Strickler 
swindle in  1925, in which the G C FA  was tricked into shipping over 10,000 
tons o f cocoa to America in return  for only a small advance paym ent, the idea 
being that a  generous balance would be paid after delivery. But paym ent was 
never m ade, over £300,000 was lost, 50 and  the G C FA  tem porarily  lost its 
mass support in the rural areas.
The cocoa hold-up o f  1930-31
In  the  years following the Strickler fiasco, a ttention  was prim arily focus­
sed on  the dom estic m arket. W ith the rising price levels o f  the late 1920s, 
producers weie happy to  sell for ready cash to  expatriate purchasers; whilst at 
the same tim e the vigorous com petition between expatriate buyers enabled 
cocoa brokers to exploit their position by extracting higher commission rates 
from the firm s.51 Indeed, so prosperous was this era for the brokers that 
their activities a ttracted  the a tten tion  o f  a num ber o f  wealthy chiefs, who 
themselves began to  speculate in the purchase o f  cocoa stocks.52 But the sud­
den fall in  the price level in  the early m onths o f  1930 —  which coincided
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with the form ation  o f the 1930 pool —  robbed these chiefs o f any chance o f 
immediate profit. Blaming the pool for the fall in price, they then  resolved 
on using their political influence to  prom ote a hold-up o f  cocoa so as to  force 
the pool to  offer a  higher price.
R ather than  share the leadership o f the hold-up w ith the G C F A  and the 
new men o f wealth that it represented, the chiefs turned for assistance to  the 
longer established u rban  traders and lawyers (w ith whom they had many 
personal connections). These traders, in tu rn , saw a  chance to  succeed as 
brokers by circum venting existing channels by gaining contro l over held up 
stocks; and in August 1930 they convened an  Econom ic Conference to  decide 
their course o f  ac tio n .53
The leadership o f the hold-up was now effectively assum ed by A. J. 
Ocanscy, a m an o f established commercial success, who realised th at w ithout 
the support o f the large farm ers, the m ovem ent could never hope to  prosper 
and  for this reason he sought to  win over the G C FA , which had  been so 
slighted by the chiefs. A meeting was held w ith G C FA  representatives in 
late September, and  in O ctober a mass meeting o f  farm ers was held at 
Nsawam  to- consider the form ation o f a  ‘G old  C oast and A shanti C ccoa 
Federation’. 54 Sitting under the chairm anship o f  N ana Sir O fori A tta, 
Om anhenc o f Akyem A buakw a, farm ers rallied to  the  call to form  the Fede­
ration  and to hold back their cocoa until the firms’ current price o f  10/-was 
raised to 2 5 /- Ocansey was elected President o f  the Federation , A yew Vice- 
President, whilst o ther posts were filled by the nom inees o f the urban traders 
and  chiefs.
In  contrast to  the brief and  localised affairs o f  1921/22 and 1922/23, the 
hold-up o f 1930-31 was longer lasting, better organised and effective over a 
much wider area. W hereas in earlier instances the core areas o f  support were 
a round  pioneer cocoa towns such as Tafo, M angoase and K oforidua, in 
1930-31 the hold-up was practically absolute in the whole o f  the Eastern Pro­
vince and alm ost equally effective in the W estern and  C entral Provinces o f 
the C olony .55 The m ajor weakness, however, was the failure o f the hold-up 
to take root in A shanti, despite attem pts by the organisers to  m obilise a  wider 
support. A lthough there were isolated instances where farm ers held back their 
supplies, the m ajority o f  A shantis were unwilling to  lend their aid , partly  
because of the reluctance o f Prcmpeh, the Kum asihene, to  lend his weight to  a 
movement which might weaken his standing w ith the  adm inistration , and 
consequently com prom ise his cam paign for the  restoration  o f  the A sante 
Confederacy.
The hold-up finally collapsed because the conflicting objectives o f the 
groups allied together in the Federation  pulled the m ovem ent a p art. In the 
first place, the backing that the chiefs gave to  the ho ld-up brough t them into 
direct conflict with the adm inistration. The governm ent viewed the system 
o f chiefly rule as one o f  its m ajor instrum ents fo r m aintaining political 
control, and  in exchange for granting them  considerable au tonom y fiom  
central governm ent, the chiefs were expected to  lend their cooperation in
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stabilising the adm in istration’s authority . T hus, once the chiefs began 
using their powers in defiance o f the law to fine farm ers, brokers and  labour­
ers for violating oaths to  m aintain  the hold-up, they threatened to  dism antle 
the whole edifice o f  colonial order. As a  consequence, the adm in istration  
reacted to  the chiefs’ cam paign with considerable vigour, and  exerted all its 
available powers to bring them  back into line. W ithout the political support 
o f  the chiefs, the larger farm ers were unable to  prevent small producers in 
need o f  cash from  selling to  the firms w ithout resorting to  violence, a practice 
which opened them  to  p rosecution  in the courts.
I f  the chiefs were a larm ed by the vigour w ith which the adm in istration  
reacted against them , they were also concerned at the extent to  which leader­
ship o f  the m ovem ent steadily gravitated tow ards m ilitant elements am ong 
the larger farm ers, a factor vt-hich threatened their own authority . In  add ition , 
as the cocoa hold-up continued, it increasingly became in the chiefs’ econom ic 
interest to  bring it to  an  end. Together w ith the u rban traders, chiefs had  
been accum ulating stocks by purchasing cocoa a t low' prices from  sm all 
farm ers who were in desperate need o f cash. As their capital became exhausted  
by those purchases, holders o f  cocoa stocks realised that they had  little  
alternative but to  sell d irect to  the firms. I f  the hold-up was to  end too  
suddenly, however, the price w ould plunge even further and  would wipe o u t 
any chance o f profit th a t they still hoped to  make. T hus, it became their 
main objective to  bring ab o u t an  ordered release o f cocoa stocks for sale to
irm s in such a m anner as to  prevent a precipitate decline in price and , to  
this end, leaders o f  the Federation  met with government officials, and  pool 
representatives on  16 December. However, the firms were unwilling to  m ake 
any meaningful concessions, and  the meeting dispersed inconclusively.56
The scene was now set for ’ he final denouement. In the past few weeks, two 
leading groups had crystallised within the Federation: the chiefs and their 
u rban  allies who wished to  realise their investm ents by selling their stocks to  
the firms, and  the large farm ers who still wished to hold o u t for a  b e tte r 
price. Now these con trad ictory  objectives brought the two groups in to  con­
flict, for the form er g roup established a Select Com m ittee to consider the idea 
o f  selling cocoa to  non-pool firms in order to  encourage com petition w ith 
the pool. The Select C om m ittee recom mended that 20 per cent o f  the held- 
up crop should be released for sale to  non-pool firms between 6 and 20 
January, and further suggested that the proposals be discussed at a mass m eet­
ing on 6 Ja n u a ry .57 On the appointed day, however,Ocansey announced 
to  the Federation  th a t he had already sent orders to  the various states (i.e. 
the chiefs) to  release their cocoa. The adm ission caused an  im m ediate u p ­
ro a r am ong .t the larger farm ers who had been resolute in wishing to  
m aintain the  hold-up. B ut there was little  th at they could do , for selling 
had already begun. A lthough farm ers attem pted  to  sustain resistance, cocoa 
began to  flood on to  the m arket, and  what had been feared all along became 
an  inevitable reality : the price o f cocoa tum bled to  a lower level th an  
th a t obtaining before the ho ld-up had ever begun.
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In  m aterial term s, therefore, the hold-up was a  disaster. A fter m onths 
o f struggle and hard  ;hip, the vast m ajority o f farm ers received a lower price 
for their cocoa in January than  they would have received in the preceding 
O ctober. Nonetheless, the hold-up was significant in contributing  tow ards 
the form ation o f  a  wider conciousness am ong rural elem ents th a t their 
interests were opposed to  the existing econom ic and political order. A lthough 
the movem ent began as a  purely econom ic cam paign, w ithin a brief period 
it had  developed political overtones. N ot only did it begin to  underm ine the 
au tho rity  o f  the chiefs, b u t it was also harnessed by certain  u rban  leaders, 
notably  K obina Sekyi,5* to  provide backing for broader, an ti-colonial 
objectives—a factor which was reported  upon  w ith considerable anxiety in 
official despatches sent by the G overnor to  L ondon. However, the econom ic 
collapse o f the hold-up prevented any fu rther political developm ent and  it 
was to  be ano ther seven years before farm ers could once m ore sum m on up 
their powers o f cohesion and  present a  fundam ental challenge to  political 
au th o rity  and expatriate dom ination.
The cocoa hold-up o f  1937/8
Low prices for cocoa continued th ro u g h o u tth cm id -I9 3 0 s,an d  en trep re­
neurs once more interested themselves in direct participation  in the m ark e t­
ing structure. N one o f the various m arketing schemes th at were launched m et 
with any notable success, and ihe m ajority ended in financial m isfortune. 
But the m ost signficant scheme—w hich was launched under the auspices o f  a  
N ational Cocoa C ontrol Board in 1934— dem onstra ted  the growing linkages 
between producers in the Colony and  A shanti. Initiated by Kw am e Ayew, 
and inspired by the ideas o f Tete Ansa, the C ontrol Board was com posed o f  
representatives from  the entire cocoa belt. Supported  by leading chiefs, 
notably  Ofori A tta  and Prem peh, the Board called fo r a hold-up u n til such 
tim e as a working machinery for m arketing cocoa had been established, 
the idea being that shipm ent and overseas re-salc w ould be carried o u t by 
the firm o f  W. Bartholom ew, a  small expatriate shipping concern which was 
attem pting  to break the oligopolistic dom ination  o f  the larger com bines. 
However, the hold-up was badly organised and  never becam e fully effective. 
Successive years o f  depressed prices m eant that farm ers had a lack o f  ready 
money and  were correspondingly in need o f  cash, chiefs were wary o f  exerting 
their au tho rity  too openly to  m aintain the hold-up, lest they once m ore 
clash w ith the adm inistration, and Ayew was never able to  p ro d u ce  
convincing evidence that Bartholom ew were able to finance such a  grandiose 
ven ture .59
T he world price o f  cocoa improved steadily th ro u g h o u t 1935/36 a n d  in. 
1936/37 producers enjoyed the best prices since the late 1920s. It was hard ly  
surprising, therefore, that producers blamed a  fall in  price a t the beginning 
o f  season 1937/38 on the form ation  o f the latest buying agreem ent. F arm ers 
concluded th at the agreem ent firms had deliberately m anipulated th e  price
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fall, and as a result,they offered a  display o f  resistance m ore effective than 
on any previous occasion. A hold-up,!aunchcd in O ctober by mass meetings 
o f farmers, ran  right through to  A pril, and resulted in the appoin tm ent of 
an  official Com mission o f Inquiry by the Secretary o f  State for the Colonies.
The m ain difference between the hold-up o f  1937-38 and its predecessors 
lay in the dep th  o f support on which it was able to call. W hereas in earlier 
years, hold-ups had failed because the sectional interests o f  the various 
groups involved failed to  coincide fo r more than  a brief length o f  time, in 
1937-38 the interests of the most im portan t elements rem ained com plem entary 
throughout the season. In add ition , unlike on  earlier occasions, the hold-up 
gained active and enthusiastic support in Ashanti.
The hold-up had its origin in the dissatisfaction o f the farm ers, large 
and small, w ith the sudden fall in price, which they ascribed to the m arket 
m anipulation o f the firms. Mass m eetings were held in both the C olony and  
Ashanti in late October and early Novem ber, a hold-up proclaim ed, and a 
committee appoin ted  to  ariange for cooperative m arketing60 and, on this 
occasion, the farm ers gained the assistance o f the largest brokers. Previously, 
the brokers’ interest in earning com m ission and o ther benefits had led them  
resolutely to  oppose any in terrup tion  o f  the m arketing o f  cocoa, but on this 
occasion their interests coincided with those o f the farm ers, for the Agree­
ment represented a determined a ttack  on their position as middlemen. Thus 
brokers were alm ost unanim ous in  declaring their support for the hold-up, 
and g cn, too, that many o f them  were members o f the farm ing com m unity 
in their own right, they were readily incorporated into the struggle.
If the hold-up had its origin in  the spontaneous protests o f  the farmers, 
then its successful m aintenance had much to do w ith the support that the 
farmers gained from  the chiefs. The chiefs’ own econom ic interests as farm ers 
and their political need to m aintain  popular support encouraged them  to 
play a positive role in ensuring that the hold-up remained firm. However, 
the experience o f 1930-31 rem ained fresh in their minds, and they were 
reluctant to  mobilise their au tho rity  to  prevent sales o f cocoa in such a 
manner as to  provoke the w rath o f  the adm inistration. Hence their participa­
tion  was cautious, and the chiefs adopted  the role o f  interm ediary between 
government and  people; the m ain burden o f  exercising coercive sanctions 
being left to  the large farmers who headed local producer groups. N onethe­
less, the au thority  o f the chiefs, exercised with considerable discretion though 
it was, was crucial in the early m onths o f  1938 when smaller farm ers— pressed 
by financial need—began to waver in  their determ ination to  w ithhold their 
cocoa from the m arket.
The course o f  the hold-up was so extended that it is possible to  focus 
here only upon certain characteristics which contributed to  its longevity. The 
first characteristic as has been noted above was the vigorous determ ination o f  
producer and non-producer alike —  farm ers, chiefs and  brokers —  to o p ­
pose the pool. Second, this determ ination was strengthened by the refusal o f  
the firms —  in  their various m eetings with the  chiefs acting as p o p u lar
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intermediaries —  to publish the Agreement (through fear o f  misrepresenta­
tion in the local press and a belief that publication of a private document 
would be a sign o f weakness). This refusal, in tu rn , strengthened the resolve 
o f the farmers to  hold out. Third, corresponding to  the producers’ determi­
nation not to sell, the firms resolved to  fight to  the finish. By mid-December, 
negotiations with producers’ representatives had broken dow n, and the firms 
engaged in tactics that were designed to underm ine resistance to  them . U.A.C. 
withdrew from the world m arket as sellers in an a ttem pt to boost the world 
price o f  cocoa, while, on the Gold C oast itself, firms began to  bring legal ac­
tions against chiefs and farm ers who were allegedly using coercion to  m ain­
tain the hold-up.
As the hold-up wore on, the govenm ent became increasingly eager to 
bring it to a  peaceful conclusion. F rom  the very beginning, the  government 
had recognised th ? f the hold-up was based firmly on the mass support o f  the 
farm ers and that the chiefs had been initially propelled into action for fear of 
losing their popularity and political influence. It realised, too, that a  nation­
wide movement, socially cohesive and efficiently led, could severely challenge 
the existing political order. Accordingly, the government leant over back­
wards to contain the situation, realising that to  pressure the chiefs as it had 
done in 1930/31 would provoke further resentm ent am ongst the farmers and 
possibly re-direct their anger towards the adm inistration and  the system o f 
colonial rule that it represented. However, considerable tim e passed before 
the governor was able to convince the im perial authorities o f  the threat, and 
it was not until February 1938 that the governm ent was able to  secure the 
appointm ent o f  an independent commission under the chairm anship o f  M r 
W illiam Nowell, whose purpose would be to exam ine ways and  m eans of 
bring the hold-up to a  just conclusion.
The news o f the commission was received w ith trium ph, but chiefs and 
head farmers determined that the hold-up shoud be continued until the com ­
mission could assure them o f  a good price. Tire commission itself regarded the 
calling o f a truce as its first priority, and it suggested to the firms that they 
suspend the buying agreement for the rem ainder o f  the season, in return for 
which the farmers would agree to  end all organised opposition. But the firms 
were not prepared to accept this suggestion unless it was accom panied by offi­
cial prohibition o f  exports o f  cocoa except by licences —  which would be 
allocated according to  shipments made in seasons 1935/36 and 1936/37. As 
this was the same basis which underlay the division o f  exports under the pool, 
the firms were effectively asking that the Agreem ent be enacted by statute! 
Eventually the firms’ conditions were agreed upon, but in o rder to make the 
deal savour more sweetly to  the farm ers’ leaders, the governor was given the 
authority  to  dispense export licences up  to  3000 tons (later reduced to  2000 
tons) to  meet the requirement o f  African shippers. W ith this b ait before them , 
the leading chiefs and farm ers showed themselves ready to  accept the truce 
and to  recommend the resum ption o f  m arketing, which they did on 25 
April. 6 2
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